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Mindfulness,  Adult Learning and Therapeutic Education : integrating the 
cognitive and affective domains of learning 
Terry Hyland – Professor in the School of Arts, Media & Education – University of 
Bolton, Eagle Campus, Deane Rd,, Bolton BL3 5AB (t.hyland@bolton.ac.uk) 
________________________________________________________________ 
Abstract 
Although it has been given qualified approval by a number of  philosophers of 
education, the so-called ‘therapeutic turn’ in education has been the subject of 
criticism by several commentators on post-compulsory and adult learning over the 
last few years. A key feature of this alleged development in recent educational policy 
is said to be the replacement of the traditional goals of knowledge and understanding 
with personal and social objectives concerned with enhancing and developing 
confidence and self-esteem in learners. After offering some critical observations on 
these developments, I suggest that there are some educationally justifiable goals 
underpinning what has been described as a therapeutic turn.  Whilst accepting that 
‘self-esteem’ and cognate concepts cannot provide a general end or universal aim of 
education, the therapeutic function – the affective domain of learning - is more 
valuable and significant than is generally acknowledged.  This claim is justified by an 
examination of the concept of ‘mindfulness’ which, it is argued, can be an immensely 
powerful and  valuable notion which is integrally connected with the centrally 
transformative and developmental nature of learning and educational activity at all 
levels.  The incorporation of mindfulness strategies within adult learning programmes 
may go some way towards re-connecting the  cognitive and affective dimensions of 
education. 
Keywords: Therapeutic Education, Mindfulness, Affective Learning, Buddhism 
and Education 
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The Aims of Education 
In a recent issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Education the editor, Paul Standish, 
welcomed the fact that ‘questions of happiness and wellbeing are prominent in 
contemporary social policy and practice, and in current policy initiatives they abound’ 
(2007,p.285).  The idea here is that the ultimate  ends of education – self-esteem, job 
and life satisfaction,  and the promotion of trust and social justice in the wider 
community – seem to be taken rather more seriously these days than they were in 
the drab neo-liberal and utilitarian 1980s and 90s.  Standish goes on, however, to 
qualify these observations by noting – in the context of a review of recent books 
recording the rise and fall of progressive education – how certain central features of 
progressivism (creativity and individualism) are grossly mutated and manipulated in 
current policy and practice to serve non-progressive and exclusively economistic 
ends. 
 
This qualification is certainly necessary at a time when the affective dimension of 
learning – in the form of criticisms of an alleged ‘therapeutic turn’ – is under attack. 
A few years ago, I offered a tentative response (along with Veronica McGivney, 
Hyland, 2005) to Kathryn Ecclestone’s (2004,a,b) concerns about adult educators’ 
obsession with developing self-esteem.   Ecclestone (2004a) was particularly 
concerned about the growing popularity of notions such as ‘self esteem’ and 
‘emotional intelligence’ in educational circles.   This has led to: 
new professional activities in emotional management, life coaching, mentoring, counselling, 
and interventions to build self-esteem and make people feel good emotionally in the pursuit of 
motivation, educational achievement and social inclusion (p.11). 
  
Moreover, it was claimed that the ‘professional and popular support for these ideas’ 
is now so strong ‘that they have become a new social and educational orthodoxy’ 
(ibid.). 
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Hayes (2003) advanced similar arguments in investigating recent policy trends in 
vocational education and training (VET) in the post-school sector.  The proposal is 
that – alongside the ‘triumph of vocationalism’ over the last few decades – there has 
been a ‘triumph of therapeutic education’ , a ‘form of preparation for work’ arising out 
of the ‘changed nexus between work and education’ (p.54).  He goes on to explain 
that: 
The new vocational skills that are required in the workforce are sometimes called ‘emotional’ 
or ‘aesthetic’ labour.  If post-school students are being trained in personal and social skills as 
well as in relationships, this is training in emotional labour…training in emotional labour… 
requires and receives a personal and wholehearted commitment to workplace values (ibid.) 
 
What results is a form of VET in which the pursuit of knowledge – and the values of 
‘rationality, objectivity, science and progress’ – are replaced by a set of post- 
modernist relativistic values concerned only with developing ‘self-esteem’ (ibid.). 
 
It seemed to me then and still does so now that the so-called therapeutic turn is no 
more than a proper concern with the affective dimension of learning and, moreover, 
that this needed to be emphasised in the face of the relentless economising of 
education – what Avis et al (1996) described as the ‘vocationalisation of everyday 
life’ (p.165) - under the label of behaviourist skills and competences (Hyland,1999).  
The original worries and concerns, however, still seem to be around.  Ecclestone, 
Hayes and Furedi (2005) continued to argue against the ‘idea that education should 
play a prominent role in fostering students’ emotional intelligence, self-esteem and 
self-awareness’(p.182), and Ecclestone and Hayes (2008) have  recently 
collaborated on a book which charts the ‘dangerous rise’ of therapeutic ideas at all 
levels of the system.  A central claim is that: 
Sponsored enthusiastically by the British government and supported by numerous academic 
researchers and a huge professional and commercial industry, a deluge of interventions 
throughout the education system assess the emotional needs and perceived vulnerability of 
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children, young people and adults and claim to develop their emotional literacy and well being 
(ibid., p.ix). 
 
Offering general support for these critics of therapy within the context of the 
discourse on adult education theory and practice – Jane Thompson (2007) has 
expressed similar misgivings.  She observes that: 
 
In the popular wisdom of adult education practice it is certainly the case that ideas about 
confidence, emotional intelligence, and self-esteem are commonplace.  The literature of 
funding applications, project reports and evaluation exercises are full of claims by policy-
makers and practitioners alike that interventions targeted at so-called non-traditional learners 
and socially excluded groups give rise to increased confidence and self-esteem (p.303). 
 
Such developments, Thompson argues, are dangerous – not only because they 
neglect or marginalise some of the traditional core values of adult learning concerned 
with developing knowledge and understanding for active citizenship – but also in their 
tendency to suggest that ‘developing confidence and self-esteem can remedy a wide 
range of personal and social problems’  with the result that this ‘distracts attention 
from the structural causes of inequality…and from the widening gap between rich 
and poor more generally’(p.304). 
 
Therapy and Education: Some Reflections 
Does this dystopian vision of contemporary adult learning and education accord with 
reality? What do these claims about a therapeutic turn actually mean and are they 
justified against the background of recent trends in post-school education and 
training?  More significantly, for the purposes of my particular concern with the 
importance of mindfulness in personal educational growth and development, do the 
new emphases amount to anything more than giving due and proper attention to the 
affective domain of learning? 
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If it is indeed the case that traditional goals linked to knowledge and understanding 
are being replaced by personal and social skills for post-school students, this trend 
should be forcefully criticised and resisted.  The alleged mutation of VET into some 
form of employability counselling also needs to be vigorously challenged, as does 
any transformation of the traditional social, political and cultural objectives of adult 
education into psychotherapy.  Before completely endorsing this crusade, however, 
we need to ask whether the claims about the therapeutic turn are sensible, coherent 
and justified.  
 
In earlier observations, it was noted (Hyland,2005, 2006, 2009) that the bleak picture 
of a post-school sector dominated by objectives linked to self-esteem and emotional 
intelligence was not one which was easily recognisable.  On the contrary, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the current educational climate is seriously impoverished 
through the dominance of prescriptive skill-talk and behaviourist competence 
outcomes (Lea et al, 2003; Hyland and Winch,2007).  However, although the worries 
about the rise of therapy are, in my view, exaggerated and unjustified, the concerns 
of critics are sincere and need to be addressed.  One way of doing this would be to 
show how educational and therapeutic processes are interrelated.  There are two 
main ways of making sense of any such questions: through empirical investigation or 
by philosophical/conceptual analysis.  I intend to examine the therapeutic arguments 
by means of each method in turn. 
 
Has there been a therapeutic turn in the English Education System? 
First of all we need to be certain of what exactly we are looking for in the form of a  
turn towards therapeutic education.  Ecclestone and Hayes (2008) assert: 
We define any activity that focuses on perceived emotional problems and which aims to make 
educational content and learning processes more ‘emotionally engaging’ as ‘therapeutic 
education’ (p.x). 
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As indicated already, I am concerned to advocate an enhancement of the affective 
domain of learning and would not naturally choose to use the term ‘therapeutic 
education’ but – since this seems to have become the label of choice which informs 
the debate in this sphere – I will use it as a short-hand way of referring to those 
features of educational development I wish to discuss.  I would not object to the 
heavy emphasis on emotions revealed in the above quotation since standard 
accounts of affective learning include references to emotions.  However, it needs to 
be pointed out here (and this will be stressed throughout the paper) that  the 
cognitive and affective domains can be viewed as  integrally connected and mutually-
dependent (Peters, 1972; Hepburn, 1972), and that the references to emotions in an 
educational context directs attention to  learning experiences which encapsulate 
quite complex activities such as receiving, internalising and organising information 
from a wide range of sources, in addition to ‘developing a value system and 
demonstrating self-reliance’ (Fawbert, 2008, p.90).  There is a cognitive aspect of all 
emotions and an affective dimension of cognition; this is what Scheffler (1991) is 
wanting to emphasise in his work on the ‘cognitive emotions’. 
 
There may be some truth to Furedi’s (2003) critique of contemporary society in terms 
of its fostering of a ‘victim culture’ in which a pre-occupation with emotional well-
being and self-esteem serves to anesthetise people in times of social and economic 
risk and uncertainty.  We might accept that there is simply too much emphasis on 
personal counselling and individual rights and not enough on active citizenship duties 
and responsibilities in current times. It must also be acknowledged that – if all this is 
true – it is regressive and disempowering.  What is difficult to discern, however, is 
how this putative change in general attitudes and ethos is influencing educational 
trends to any great extent.  Many of the actual examples cited by Ecclestone 
(2004a,b), for example, are drawn from the general field of counselling and the 
popular press, not specifically from educational contexts.  She regrets the 
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replacement of ‘optimistic Rogerian ideas about humans’ innate potential and drive 
for empowerment’ with ‘pessimistic images of people locked in cycles of social 
depression caused by emotional problems’ (2004a,p.13).  If this were true, it would 
be most regrettable. However, it could be argued that – apart from a highly 
theoretical, inspirational impact akin to that of Paulo Freire on adult literacy tutors – 
Rogers has never had any practical influence on the English post-school education 
system.  I would suggest that the alleged pessimistic perspectives have no greater 
impact or influence on the business of learning and teaching in the post-16 sector.   
 
Similarly, although there may be some evidence for the rise of the ‘diminished self’ 
(Ecclestone, Hayes and Furedi, 2005) in popular culture,  claims about its 
transference to specifically educational contexts require more justification than 
references to the use of Goleman’s writings on emotional literacy and intelligence in 
a number of contemporary projects (this is discussed in more detail later).  In this 
respect, we can reflect again on the popularity of Rogers and Freire in post-school 
learning texts, and the actual impact these have on everyday practices.   The 
‘learning prescriptions’ mentioned by Ecclestone, Hayes and Furedi (ibid.,p.186) 
seem to be unduly distorted for the purposes of criticism and do not reflect the huge 
advances made in learning support services at all levels of post-school provision.  
More recently, Hunt and West (2006) have suggested that – far from offering a 
diminished conception of learning – the integration of educational and therapeutic 
processes through the use of psychodynamic notions can be empowering for 
learners and teachers alike.   The discussion of mindfulness ideas and practices later 
is intended to engage with just such notions of selfhood by examining their place in 
educational debate. 
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However, staying with developments in the post-compulsory sector for the moment, I 
think the idea of a diminishment of learners and learning may, indeed, have some 
purchase as a result of the predominance of utilitarian and economistic conceptions 
over the last decade or so.  Policy studies of this sector (Ainley, 1999; Lea et al, 
2003; Hyland & Merrill, 2003) suggest that the key trends at this level over recent 
years have been the rise of undifferentiated skill-talk, an obsession with prescriptive 
learning outcomes and the dominance of competence-based education and training 
(CBET).  The so-called therapeutic turn pales into insignificance alongside the 
damage wreaked by CBET and the behaviourist outcomes movement, bringing with it 
the radical de-skilling of countless occupations (including teaching), the downgrading 
of vocational studies and the rise to prominence of a perversely utilitarian and one-
sidedly economistic conception of the educational enterprise in general (Avis, et al, 
1996; Hyland, 1999; Hyland and Winch, 2007).  Emphasising affective goals and 
fostering motivation and confidence in learners is, arguably, far less dangerous than 
suggesting that all that counts in education and training is providing bits of evidence 
to satisfy narrow, mechanistic performance criteria. 
 
Moreover, many of the initiatives referred to by Ecclestone and Hayes (2008) in 
further education (FE) colleges which point ‘towards a strong caring and nurturing 
ethos’ (p.66) are, as Cripps (2002) explains, a necessary counter-balance to the 
competitive, economistic  and managerialist ethos which has transformed those 
institutions in recent decades. Avis (2009) has argued that the resulting 
‘performativity...operates within a blame  culture’, where accountability becomes a 
means by which the institution can call to account its members’ (p.250) and that this 
has led to a decline in creativity, risk-taking and trust in the post-school system. 
 
Although I am primarily concerned with post-school education, it is worth referring to 
the arguments of Ecclestone and Hayes (2008) about the rise of therapeutic 
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practices in the school sector at this point.  Their account includes references to the 
use of ‘circle time’, ‘feelings trees’, ‘worry boxes’ and the use of psychodrama in 
primary schools (pp.28-35) – in addition to a discussion of such initiatives as peer 
mentoring, personal, social and health education and citizenship modules in the 
secondary sector (pp.55-60) – but there is little attempt to link such trends with the 
radical transformation of these sectors over recent years by the performance, 
accountability and managerialist culture mentioned above.  The obsession with 
standards and league tables in the school sector since the 1990s is directly 
connected with the emergence of concerns about the affective side of education.  As 
Cigman (2008) suggests: 
 
A standards agenda involves identifying and possibly shaming children and schools that fail.  
The social consequences of educational failure include disaffection, delinquency, violence 
and so on: the very problems that the standards agenda set out to address…It was this 
concern that led to a supplementary agenda focusing on so-called non-cognitive traits like 
confidence, motivation, resilience, well—being and self-esteem…The idea emerged that there 
are necessary affective conditions for successful learning, and that these can be usefully 
boosted, heightened or enhanced’(p.540).  
 
Writing in a similar vein about the revival of concerns about happiness and well-being 
in educational discourse, Smith (2008) observes that: 
As I have described it, the ‘long slide to happiness’ begins with the unexceptionable 
observation that an education system dominated by targets and testing is experienced as arid 
by both pupils and students on the one hand and those who teach them on the other (p.570). 
 
 
Since the post-16 sector has been influenced even more than schools by the 
imposition of top-down policy changes (a fact specifically mentioned by Ecclestone 
and Hayes, 2008, p.65) linked to the skills and employability agenda, it is not difficult 
to understand why a post-16 counter agenda concerned – as in the schools – with 
affective learning outcomes might well emerge.  My argument, however, is that this 
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reaction has been far too timid, lacklustre and indiscriminate, and that there should 
be a more vigorous and systematic re-emphasis of affective objectives in this sector.   
Most learners in the post-school sector are either studying (increasingly preparing to 
re-sit examinations these days) for GCSEs/A-levels or pursuing vocational 
qualifications, so the notion that such programmes are more than marginally 
concerned with building self-esteem or emotional intelligence is difficult to accept 
(basic skills or ‘skills for life’ discussed below is, of course, extremely vocational and 
employment-led and has little to do with the affective domain).    
 
There is more than enough scope to argue that much of this post-16 learning is 
grossly deficient in precisely this affective area; it does not connect or engage 
sufficiently with the emotions, values and wider interests which learners bring with 
them to post-compulsory institutions (Hyland & Merrill, 2003).  Writing about 
American education in recent years, Palmer (1998) noted similar tendencies and 
criticised educators’ ‘excessive regard for the powers of the intellect…our obsession 
with objective knowledge’ and recommended learning programmes which stress 
‘subjective engagement…the power of emotions to freeze, or free, the mind’ (p.61) 
The increase in mental health and emotional/behavioural  problems in the post-
school sector is now being acknowledged with a view to researching and 
implementing strategies to remedy the main problems (Warwick et al, 2008). All this 
is symptomatic of the wider emotional distress experienced by many people in 
Western industrialised states which Harvey (2005) has linked with the relentless rise 
of neo-liberalism since the 1970s. 
It does not seem sensible to suggest that a sector which has been dominated for the 
last decade or so with ill-founded skill-talk and behaviourist CBET is somehow awash 
with affective objectives.  It is true that certain features of competence-based learning 
have been perversely (mis-) matched with progressive, individualised and student-
centred strategies (Hyland,1999), but this pedagogic absurdity no longer confuses or 
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misleads anyone working in the further and higher education sector.  Moreover, it is 
difficult to make much sense of Hayes’ idea that basic skills (2003,p.55) – a self-
evident pre-requisite for learning of any kind – is an example of the reduction of 
education to therapy.  For learners, young or old, who achieved little at school and 
associate learning with anxiety, grief and failure, a ‘therapeutic’ concern with 
foundational skills, attitudes and motivations may be exactly what is called for. 
 
Ecclestone and Hayes (2008)  provide lots of evidence in their book based on 
conversations with teachers, analysis of mission statements of schools and colleges, 
and references to emerging government policy initiatives – and lots of quotations 
from the interpersonal counselling and emotional management industry – but, as 
Kinman (2008) noted in her review of the book, the ‘authors provide little in the way 
of peer-reviewed evidence for the strong assertions in the book’ and ‘rely heavily on 
“pop psychology” texts and unsupported hypotheses’(p.50).  To be fair, Ecclestone 
and Hayes (2008) do confront this issue of evidence for the therapeutic turn fairly and 
squarely and argue that they are charting a broad ‘cultural shift’ in politics and society 
which has become a ‘central focus for education policy’ (pp.146-7).  However, even 
though  I think it is better to maintain a reflective agnosticism about the precise extent 
of a therapeutic turn, my case is that, if there is little evidence of such a trend, then it 
is a great pity since the widespread transformations of the system mentioned above 
do seem to merit a resurgence of attention to this dimension of education.  
 
Education and Well-Being 
A central slogan in the progressive education movement of the earlier 20th century 
was ‘we teach children – not subjects’, and this was, as Dearden (1968) suggests, a 
direct reaction to the drab authoritarianism and inhuman social utility of the 
elementary school tradition in England (graphically depicted and satirized in Charles 
Dickens’ Hard Times and D.H. Lawrence’s The Rainbow). What was to become the 
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paradigm text of the progressive movement– the Plowden Report published by the 
Department of Education and Science in 1967 – described the ideal school 
environment as ‘one in which children learn to live first and foremost as children and 
not as adults’. It was recommended that schools should set out to ‘devise the right 
environment for children, to allow them to be themselves’, and special emphasis was 
placed upon ‘individual discovery, on first-hand experience and on opportunities for 
creative work’ (Plowden Report, 1967, pp.187-8). 
  
Although there was always more rhetoric than reality (in a way similar to that 
surrounding the impact of Rogers and Freire on post-school education) about the 
claims that progressive philosophy was transforming English schools in the 1960s 
and 1970s (Hyland, 1979; Lowe,2007), such ideas did inspire the open education 
movement in America as the earlier influences of Dalton and Dewey were re-
discovered and applied to new times.  Rathbone (1971), one of the leading open 
education exponents of the period, claimed that Plowden’s views on the nature of 
childhood underpinned the ‘open education ethic’ which entailed treating children 
with ‘courtesy, kindness, and respect…valuing [the child] as a human being whose 
rights are no less valid than those of an adult’ (p.112).  In a similar vein, the new 
openness in education was described as ‘a way of extending the school’s human 
dimension’ (Pluckrose, 1975,p.3) and, more grandly, an ‘attempt to create a new 
human and social world’ (Bremer,1975, p.18).  In the stress on student-centredness 
and individualised learning, such perspectives later came to influence post-school 
education (Hyland & Merrill, 2003) as well though – in an era of behaviourist 
outcomes – any such affective aims could never be more than marginal to the 
acquisition of qualifications for working life. 
 
In the midst of all the rhetoric it is not difficult to recognise a number of fairly 
unexceptionable  notions about the fact that education is surely about personal 
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development as well as acquiring knowledge and skills, and that even Peters’ (1966) 
liberal conception of education as the development of knowledge and understanding 
for its own sake must, in some sense, be linked to more general ends such as human 
happiness and flourishing or the promotion of a just community.  To be sure, the 
subject-matter of education cannot just be, as Whitehead (1962) once 
grandiloquently put it, ‘Life in all its manifestations’ (p.10) nor, as Dearden (1972) 
correctly argues, can the ‘aim of education simply be happiness, quite without 
qualification’ (p.111). However, as Dearden goes on to emphasise, there ‘is no 
question of whether or not happiness is valuable…the question is rather that of how 
important happiness is, compared with other values, in a specifically educational 
situation’(p.109).  Similarly, Smith (2002) suggests that ‘self-esteem can usefully be 
admitted into our educational scheme of things as a significant good, but not one 
pursued directly, still less exclusively’ (p.99).  For educational purposes, what needs 
to be attached to all-embracing external ends about self-esteem, happiness or 
human flourishing are internal objectives concerned with the development of 
knowledge, understanding, autonomy and values which will enable those being 
educated to construct and participate in communities which promote and reinforce 
such flourishing.  The affective dimension of educational activity – linked to both 
processes in terms of stimulating learners’ interests and motivation and also to 
content in the acknowledgement that knowledge and skills cannot be completely 
separated from human values and emotions (Palmer, 1998; Hyland,1998) – is 
arguably what is being highlighted in referring to the therapeutic function of 
education. 
 
Wilson (1972) has pointed out that there are many connections and overlaps 
between education and therapy.  He observes that: 
Education involves initiation into activities, forms of thought, etc. which conceptually must 
be…worth while or justifiable.  Different types of justifications, or different descriptions of the 
 14 
mode in which they are worth while, may apply to different activities or groups of activities.  
Thus some may be called ‘therapeutic’, others described as ‘enlarging the personality’… 
These justification phrases may be said to represent the ‘aims of education’; and ‘therapeutic’ 
or ‘contributing to mental health’, may represent one such aim (pp.91-2). 
 
Peters (1972) has demonstrated the clear and distinct connections between human 
emotions, motivation and the sort of reasoning associated with the development of 
knowledge and understanding.  In considering why we attach the label ‘emotions’ to 
concepts such as ‘fear, anger, sorrow, grief, envy, jealousy, pity, remorse, guilt, 
shame, pride, wonder, and the like’, Peters argues the our main criterion for selection 
is ‘the connection between emotions and the class of cognitions that are conveniently 
called appraisals’ (pp.466-7).  He goes on to suggest that such appraisals are: 
constituted by seeing situations under aspects which are agreeable or disagreeable, 
beneficial or harmful in a variety of dimensions.  To feel fear is, for instance, to see a situation 
as dangerous; to feel pride is to see with pleasure something as mine or as something that I 
have had a hand in bringing about (ibid.,p.467). 
 
Since ‘emotions are basically forms of cognition’ ,we may legitimately refer to and 
recommend the ‘education of the emotions’(ibid.). Wilson (1972) is getting at 
something similar when he argues that ‘we can say that certain educational 
processes just are the same as some processes which increase mental health: that 
some forms of teaching are identical with some forms of psychotherapy’ (p.89, 
original italics).  The idea is that both learning  and therapy involve the development 
of knowledge, values, emotions, understanding, reason, skill, experience and insight, 
and both are equally necessary for accessing work, social relationships and the wider 
communities of practice which constitute the good life.   
 
In this sphere of philosophical conceptions of educational well-being, it is  worth 
concluding this section by referring to the very last sentence in the book by 
Ecclestone and Hayes (2008) which serves to bring out the profound differences 
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between us.  They conclude with the claim that ‘What makes humanity is the 
intellectual and an education based on cogito ergo sum not sentio ergo sum’ (p,164, 
original italics).  Reflecting back on the open education literature mentioned above, 
my case is that an education based only on one at the expense of the other would be 
a diminished one since it does not develop the whole person.   
 
Descartes’ infamous Cogito has, arguably, been responsible for more philosophical 
wrong turnings than anything else in Western thought. Ryle (1973) demonstrated 
how ‘Descartes’ myth’ had resulted in the ‘intellectualist legend’ which wrongly 
assumed that there was ‘an antithesis between the physical and the mental’ (p.32), 
and this led to the false dualisms between mind and body, theory and practice, 
knowing how and knowing that.  Similarly, Searle (1985) criticises the legacy of 
Descartes on the grounds that it has led to an ‘inherited cultural resistance to treating 
the conscious mind as a biological phenomenon like any other’(p.10).  Placing all this 
in the context of human evolution, Pinker (1997) explains clearly ‘why we have 
emotions’; he argues that the 
emotions are mechanisms that set the brain’s highest level goals. Once triggered by a 
propitious moment, an emotion triggers the cascade of goals and sub-goals that we call 
thinking and acting…no sharp line divides thinking from feeling, nor does thinking necessarily 
precede feeling or vice versa..(p.373).    
 
This connects well with the earlier discussion of the education of the emotions, 
particularly with the analysis by Peters (1972) and Scheffler’s (1991) notion of 
cognitive emotions.  In commenting on Scheffler’s thesis, Standish (1992) explains 
how it is a ‘rationality which transcends the dualism of head and heart’ and 
explicitly rejects the common assumption that cognition and emotion are worlds apart and 
illustrates coherently the ways in which rationality and the passions are intertwined.  What is 
of interest to the scientist and what is understood in the work of art…involve a combination of 
perception and feeling (p.117). 
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Having argued the case for an education of the emotions, I want now to suggest that 
this form of therapeutic education may be enhanced by the theory and practice of 
‘mindfulness’. 
The Nature of Mindfulness 
In advocating and seeking to justify a form of therapeutic education along the lines 
outlined above, I want to draw attention to both the intrinsic and pragmatic value of 
the concept of ‘mindfulness’.  This is a core concept in Buddhist philosophy and 
practice – traditionally the seventh strand of the eightfold path leading to nirvana and 
the end of suffering – and is currently attracting widespread attention in a large 
number of spheres far removed from its natural and original home.  In the context of 
the Dharma (literally the fundamental nature of the universe revealed in the Buddhist 
canon of teachings and precepts, Keown,2005), mindfulness is of overriding 
importance. 
 
Thich Nhat Hanh (1999) – the  renowned Vietnamese Buddhist teacher and 
campaigner for world peace and justice – describes mindfulness as being ‘at the 
heart of the Buddha’s  teachings’.  It involves ‘attention to the present moment’ which 
is ‘inclusive and loving ‘ and ‘which accepts everything without judging or reacting’ 
(p.64).  Jon Kabat-Zinn (1990; 1994) and associates have been largely responsible 
for transforming the original spiritual notion into a powerful and ubiquitous therapeutic 
tool based on forms of meditation and mindful practices.  Mindfulness simply means 
‘paying attention in a particular way: on purpose, in the present moment and non-
judgmentally’ in a way which ‘nurtures greater awareness, clarity, and acceptance of 
present-moment reality’.  Such practice – whether this involves breathing or walking 
meditation or giving full non-judgmental attention to everyday activities – can offer a  
‘powerful route for getting ourselves unstuck, back in touch with our own wisdom and 
vitality’ (Kabat-Zinn,1994, pp.4-5).  Such a simple idea has proved astonishingly 
successful in a vast range of contexts including the treatment of depression, 
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addictions of various kinds, and the promotion of physical and mental health and 
well-being generally (Baer, 2006).  Harris’ (2006) robustly secular notion of such  
strategies – which are applicable to any everyday activity such as driving, washing 
dishes or solving problems, not just to contemplative or meditative practices – 
describes them in terms of ‘investigating the nature of consciousness directly through 
sustained introspection’(p.209).  
 
Like any process or activity which is concerned principally with introspection and a 
focus on inner thoughts and feelings, there seems to be a natural tendency to assign 
it a limited value because of its apparent passivity and subjective inward-looking 
character.  The description of mindfulness  by Williams, et al (2007, p.48) brings out 
the active, developmental and educational features of such practice. They note that 
mindfulness is: 
1) intentional – concerned with cultivating an awareness of present moment reality 
and the choices available to us    
2) experiential – focussing directly on present moment experience rather then being 
pre-occupied by abstractions 
3)  non-judgmental – it allows us to see things as they are without a mental 
assignment of critical labels to our thoughts, feelings and perceptions 
 
In a similar context, Smith (2002) observes that some sort of ‘inward turn’ is ‘often 
(but wrongly) associated with therapy in general’ (p.95). However, mindfulness does 
seem to be able to deal with such criticisms effectively, particularly when the concept 
is interpreted within the context of its original home in Buddhist philosophy and 
practice.   In recent years there has been a lively debate about the relevance of 
Buddhist thought to Western psychology and psychotherapy (Segall, 2003; Epstein, 
2007), and a consensus seems to have emerged about the commonalities and 
mutual objectives of the different traditions.  Rubin (2003) explains how ‘Buddhism 
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points toward possibilities for self-awareness, freedom, wisdom and compassion that 
Western psychology in general, and psychoanalysis in particular, has never mapped’ 
(p.50).  These possibilities are realised in the growing range of therapeutic 
mindfulness strategies used in health programmes (Garfinkel, 2006; Williams, et al, 
2007) and in the demonstration of the educational value of mindfulness (Langer, 
2003; Siegel, 2007). 
 
The immense potential of paying close attention to our thought processes should not 
be under-estimated.  In its normal state, the mind is often in flux as it fixes on one 
object after another in a random and dissipated manner.  By ‘cultivating mindfulness’, 
the Dalai Lama (2005), reminds us, ‘we learn first to become aware of this process of 
dissipation, so that we can gently fine-tune the mind to follow a more directed path 
towards the objects on which we wish to focus’ (p.160).  It is important to note that 
such attention has 
a deliberate intention that helps us select a specific aspect or a characteristic of an object.  
The continued, voluntary application of attention is what helps us maintain a sustained focus 
on the chosen object.  Training in attention is closely linked with learning how to control our 
mental processes (ibid.,p.161). 
 
This control – which can be an end in itself in the therapeutic uses of mindfulness – is 
linked to the central Buddhist enterprise in the process of eliminating unhelpful and 
misleading conceptions of the self.  There is, of course, a similar critical tradition in 
relation to the concept of selfhood in Western philosophy stemming from Hume’s 
famous observation in his Treatise that ‘I never can catch myself at any time without 
a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception’ (1964,p.239, 
original italics).  Within the Buddhist tradition the notion of ‘non-self’ is remarkably 
similar to both Hume and the social constructionist perspectives of more recent 
times.  Brazier (2003) explains the position clearly in observing that the Buddhist  
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approach is neither to build nor to abase the self.  It is to recognise the reality of our 
existential position in relationship with the world.  It recognizes our dependency upon 
conditions, and especially upon our physical environment… The teaching of non-self is not a 
denial of the existence of the person as a complex entity, functioning in a complex world.  
Non-self theory places people in dynamic encounter with one another and with the 
environment they inhabit.  It acknowledges the ever-unfolding social process and the ways in 
which people provide conditions for one another (p.138). 
 
In a similar vein, Epstein (2007) has explained how this conception of ‘non-self’ has 
proved so fruitful and valuable to psychologists and psychotherapists who have 
explored this tradition. 
 
Mindfulness and the Critique of Therapeutic Education 
There seem to be two main criticisms of the therapeutic function of education and I 
will address each in turn, drawing on mindfulness conceptions and cognate ideas in 
the attempt to answer the principal concerns. 
1) The emphasis on therapeutic objectives such as self-esteem, emotional 
intelligence, confidence and the like, is said to marginalise traditional goals linked to 
knowledge and understanding thereby disempowering learners.  Philosophical 
answers – in the form of explicating links between educational and therapeutic 
processes, between the cognitive and the affective – were outlined earlier, as were 
empirical considerations questioning the extent of this influence on learning and 
teaching as opposed to popular culture.  It has been argued that much educational 
activity – both at school but especially at post-school levels – is affectively 
impoverished and deficient in its treatment of humanistic as opposed to employability 
matters (Langer, 2003; Palmer, 1998; Hyland,1998).  The personal growth and 
development of learners – whether this is called fostering self-esteem, confidence or 
emotional intelligence – is an important educational objective, and the cultivation of 
mindfulness can assist in its achievement.  As a dimension of the learning process, 
mindfulness practice can effectively link all forms of learning (perhaps especially the 
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undervalued basic skills and vocational kinds) with the needs, interests and values of 
learners thus fostering engagement, motivation and that form of ‘studentship’ which, 
as Bloomer & Hodkinson (1997) have shown, is crucial in allowing post-16 students 
to make sense and take ownership of the various programmes they are following.  
The ‘present-moment reality’ developed through mindfulness is widely acknowledged 
in educational psychology as not just ‘more effective, but also more enjoyable’ 
(Langer, 2003, p.43) in many spheres of learning, and there is now a wealth of 
evidence aggregated through the Mindfulness in Education Network 
(http://www.mindfuled.org) about the general educational benefits of the approach. 
(there is also an established centre for mindfulness teaching and research at the 
University of Wales, Bangor, http://www.bangor.ac.uk/imscar/mindfulness).  
  
2) A related concern of critics of therapeutic education – particularly in adult 
education circles - is that the perceived inward-looking features associated with this 
activity severs the connections between learning and wider social and political 
issues.  Thompson (2007), for example, is worried that ‘lifelong learning has given up 
on teaching an understanding of the world, let alone trying to change it’, and that 
there is ‘every encouragement for the belief that because you cannot change the 
world, you must strive to change yourself’ (p.302).  Such claims, if true, would indeed 
be a cause for concern but I think they are misguided and unduly pessimistic.  The 
world can only be changed by people and often the reflective capacity to change 
ourselves is precisely what is required before any wider social change is possible. 
The power and potential of mindfulness in engaging with a wide range of such issues 
has been amply demonstrated in both the therapeutic (Baer, 2006; Williams, et al, 
2007) and socially engaged aspects of mindfulness (Keown, 2005; Brazier, 2003; 
Garfinkel, 2006). 
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The letting go of self in mindfulness practice results – interestingly in terms of the 
standard criticisms of the passive navel-gazing involved in fostering self-esteem and 
related qualities – in people stopping ‘relying on self-power and starting to rely more 
on other-power’ (Brazier, 2003,p,143).  This is the definitive conception of 
empowerment which is prized so highly by adult educators concerned with social 
movements and is fully realised in the impact of Buddhist mindfulness in countries 
around the world.  In the form of ‘socially engaged Buddhism’ (Garfinkel, 2006; a 
movement pioneered by Thich Nhat Hanh ) –  mindfulness practices are now 
employed in prison education, peace negotiations and the re-generation of village 
communities in deprived areas around the world.  As Garfinkel explains, such 
practice is 
being applied to augment mental and physical health therapies and to advance political and 
environmental reforms.  Athletes use it to sharpen their game. Through it, corporate 
executives learn to handle stress better.  Police arm themselves with it to defuse volatile 
situations.  Chronic pain sufferers apply it as a coping salve. (p.3).     
 
Conclusion: Mindfulness and Adult Education 
Smith (2002) is quite correct to locate self-esteem amongst the legitimate aims of 
education, and a qualified role for this dimension of education has also been 
advocated by Cigman (2004) and Kristjansson (2007).  I have tried to provide a 
justification for a more general therapeutic function based on the notion of 
mindfulness.   Mindfulness serves to remind us that – in addition to the important 
goals of developing knowledge, understanding, vocational skills and the critical 
examination of  issues of inequality, prejudice and social exclusion – there are people 
with identities, needs, values and life stories who are engaged in the struggle to deal 
with all this.  Much current educational practice fails to capture this struggle and does 
not fully engage with the emotional aspects of the enterprise. 
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In a number of writings over the last few years, Oliver James (1997,2007,2008) has 
argued that levels of emotional distress in industrialised, urbanised societies are 
much higher for English-speaking countries such as Britain, United States, Canada 
and New Zealand than they are in other nations such as France, Spain, Belgium, 
Japan and the Scandinavian states.  Using the WHO definition of emotional distress 
to include illnesses such as ‘depression, anxiety, substance abuse and impulse 
disorder’ James (2008,p.10) contends that – contra recent trends – such distress has 
little genetic causation but is directly linked to both parental upbringing and the 
impact of ‘selfish capitalism’ which expounds radically materialistic values in 
conjunction with bringing about a deterioration of income levels and working 
conditions for millions of ordinary people in mainly English- speaking countries over 
the last thirty years or so.  Similarly, Kasser’s  (2002) research in this field with 12 to 
20 year olds indicated that those who were concerned most with material goals were 
significantly more at risk of developing mental health problems.  
 
James’ solutions to these problems are strikingly simple, and now have a more 
urgent ring to them as the present economic recession seems to be deepening. 
Instead of the neo-liberal selfish version of capitalism stemming from Reagan, 
Thatcher, Blair and others, ‘our politicians must start the work of persuading us to 
adopt the unselfish variety’ (ibid., p.230) which eschews possessive, individualist 
materialism and values the emotional well-being of people as much as their 
economic productivity.  Since this is an essentially educational task, the re-assertion 
of the social and moral purposes of the endeavour in the face of the relentless 
vocational utilitarianism of recent years is, I would suggest, fully in line with what 
Thompson (2007) and other post-school and adult educators might wish to advocate.  
However, such a task will not be achieved by understating the affective/emotional 
dimension of learning but in recognising that our provision is deficient in just this 
crucial area. 
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This is where mindfulness comes into its own since its raison d’etre (at least in its 
contemporary therapeutic role) is exactly that of maintaining emotional balance and 
well-being in a radically de-stabilising, materialistic culture. There is now a body of 
evidence from neuroscientific studies pointing to the ‘neuroplasticity’ of the brain – 
the idea that ‘experience can create structural changes in the brain’ (Siegel,2007, 
p.31).  The idea is that by attending to our thoughts and perceptions, focussing on 
and re-appraising various aspects of them, we can actually influence brain chemistry 
and function (see Bakhurst, 2008 for a discussion of neuroscience within an 
educational context). Since such internal awareness and focus of attention is central 
to mindfulness strategies, such practices can serve valuable learning and therapeutic 
purposes, and this explains the successful use of mindfulness-based cognitive 
therapy (MBCT) strategies by Baer (2006) and by Williams and co-workers (2007).  
As Siegel (2007) concludes, ‘mindfulness not only helps us feel good and recover 
from negative feelings more quickly, but it can actually improve our medical 
health’(p.32).  Langer (1989) has similarly indicated how mindfulness can help older 
learners to maintain alertness, motivation and commitment, and utilising MBCT with 
patients suffering from depression, Segal, Williams and Teasdale (2002, p.315) 
demonstrated that major depression relapse rates were reduced using mindfulness 
techniques. In addition to helping to alleviate the emotional distress referred to 
above, such approaches can serve as valuable support mechanisms to learning at all 
levels, and the mindfulness and education networks are producing increasing 
evidence of such effectiveness (Langer, 2003). 
 
The Buddha famously said that he taught ‘one thing and one thing only: that is, 
suffering and the end of suffering’ (Salzberg, 1995,p.102), and this core teaching is of 
inestimable value in our current  social, economic and political climate in which  
education has to function. In helping us to let go of the often mindless and restless  
 24 
striving which lies at the heart of our mental processes and habit-driven behaviour, 
mindfulness prepares the way for genuinely rich and deep learning and the journey 
from self-obsession to a fuller engagement with life and with others. This is a 
worthwhile educational ideal.  As Thich Nhat Hanh (1999) puts it: 
Mindfulness helps us look deeply into the depths of our consciousness…When we practice 
this we are liberated from fear, sorrow and the fires burning inside us.  When mindfulness 
embraces our joy, our sadness, and all our mental formations, sooner or later we will see their 
deep roots…Mindfulness shines its light upon them and helps them to transform (p.75). 
 
All of us will at some stage of our lives have to engage with emotions such as hatred, 
love, joy, sorrow, pride and envy, and an education which failed to address such 
issues is bound to be one-sided and incomplete. Thus, contra Ecclestone and Hayes, 
I would want to conclude by saying that educational aims based only on cogito ergo 
sum would, indeed, be likely to produce diminished learners.  Educational aims 
concerned with the development of the whole person require the cogito to be 
balanced by and harmonised with objectives based on sentio ergo sum. 
 
References 
Ainley, P. (1999). Learning Policy,  London:Routledge 
 
Avis, J., et al (1996). Knowledge and Nationhood, London: Cassell) 
 
Avis, J.(2009):’Rethinking Trust in a Performative Culture: the case of education’, in  
Avis, J., Fisher, R. & Simmons, R.(eds): Issues in Post-Compulsory Education and 
Training: Critical Perspectives. Huddersfield: University of Huddersfield Press, 
pp.237-262 
 
Baer, R. A. (ed) (2006). Mindfulness-Based Treatment Approaches,  San Diego. CA: 
Elsevier 
 
Bakhurst, D.(2008).’Minds, Brains and Education’, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 42(3/4), pp.415-432 
 
Bloomer, M. & Hodkinson, P.(1997). Moving into FE – The Voice of the Learner, 
London: Further Education Development Agency  
 
Brazier, C. (2003). Buddhist Psychology,  London: Robinson 
 
Bremer, J. (1975). A Matrix for Modern Education,  Toronto: McClelland & Stewart 
 
 25 
Cigman, R.(2004). ‘Situated Self-Esteem’, Journal of Philosophy of Education,  
38(1), pp.91-105 
 
Cigman, R.(2008). ‘Enhancing Children’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
42(3/4),pp.539-557 
 
Cripps, S.(2002). Further Education, Government’s Discourse: Policy and Practice. 
Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Dalai Lama (2005). The Universe in a Single Atom,  London: Little, Brown 
 
Dearden, R.F. (1968). The Philosophy of Primary Education: An Introduction,  
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
 
Dearden, R.F. (1972). ‘Happiness and Education’, in Dearden, R.F., Hirst, P.H. & 
Peters, R.S.(eds)(op.it.), pp.95-112 
 
Dearden, R.F., Hirst, P.H. & Peters, R.S.(eds)(1972) . Education and the 
Development of Reason, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 
 
Ecclestone, K.(2004a) ‘Developing self-esteem and emotional well-being – inclusion 
or intrusion?’, Adults Learning, 16(3) pp.11-13 
 
Ecclestone, K.(2004b). ‘Learning or Therapy? The Demoralisation of Education’, 
British Journal of Educational Studies, 52(2), pp.112-137 
 
Ecclestone, K., Hayes, D. and Furedi, F.(2005). ’Knowing me, knowing you: The rise 
of therapeutic professionalism in the education of adults’, Studies in the Education of 
Adults, 37(2), pp.182-200 
 
Ecclestone, K. and Hayes, D.(2008). The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education, 
London: Routledge 
 
Epstein, M.(2007). Psychotherapy Without the Self: a Buddhist perspective, New 
Haven: Yale University Press 
 
Fawbert, F.(2008). Teaching in Post-Compulsory Education, London: Continuum) 
 
Furedi, F.(2003). Therapy Culture: Creating Vulnerability in an Uncertain Age, 
London:Routledge  
 
Garfinkel, P. (2006). Buddha or Bust, New York: Three Rivers Press 
 
Harris, S.(2006). The End of Faith, London: The Free Press 
 
Harvey, D.(2005). A Brief History of Neoliberalism,  Oxford: Oxford university Press 
 
Hayes, D.(2003). ‘The changed nexus between work and education’ in Lea, J. et al 
(eds) Working in Post-Compulsory Education,  Maidenhead: Open University Press 
 
Hepburn, R.A.(1972).’The Arts and the Education of Feeling and Emotion’, in 
Dearden, R.F., Hirst, P.H. & Peters, R.S.(eds)(1972); op.cit., pp.484-500 
 
Hume, D.(1964 edn.). A Treatise of Human Nature,  London: Everyman, Volume One 
 
 26 
Hyland, T.(1979). ‘Open Education – A Slogan Examined’, Educational Studies, 
5(1),pp.35-41 
 
Hyland, T. (1998). ‘Morality and Further Education: towards a critical values 
foundation for the post-compulsory sector in Britain’ Journal of Moral Education, 
27(3), pp.333-345 
 
Hyland, T.(1999). Vocational Studies, Lifelong Learning and Social Values, 
Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Hyland, T.(2005). ‘Learning and Therapy – oppositional or complementary 
processes’, Adults Learning, 16(5), pp.15-17 
 
Hyland, T.(2006). ‘Vocational Education and Training and the Therapeutic Turn’, 
Educational Studies, 32(3), pp.299-306 
 
Hyland, T.(2009).’Mindfulness and the Therapeutic Function of Education’, Journal of 
Philosophy of Education , 43(1) , pp.119-131 
 
Hyland, T. & Merrill, B.(2003). The Changing Face of Further Education, London: 
RoutledgeFalmer 
 
Hyland, T. & Winch, C.(2007). A Guide to Vocational Education and Training, 
London: Continuum 
 
Hunt, C. & West, L.(2006). ‘Learning in a border country: using psychodynamic ideas 
in teaching and research’,Studies in the Education of Adults, 38(2), pp.160-177 
 
James, O. (1997). Britain on the Couch – Why We’re Unhappier Compared with 
1950, Despite Being Richer,  London: Arrow 
 
James, O.(2007). Affluenza – How to be Successful and Stay Sane,  London: 
Vermilion 
 
James, O.(2008). The Selfish Capitalist,  London: Vermilion 
 
Kabat-Zinn, J.(1990). Full Catastrophe Living, London: Piatkus 
 
Kabat-Zinn, J. (1994). Mindfulness Meditation for Everyday Life, London: Piatkus 
 
Kinman, G.(2008). ‘Step outside the Rogerian circle’, Times Higher Education, 28 
Aug-3 Sept, p.50 
 
Kasser, T.(2002). The High Price of Materialism, London: MIT Press 
 
Kristjansson, K.(2007). ’Justified self-Esteem’, Journal of Philosophy of Education,  
41(2), pp.247-261 
 
Langer, E.(1989). Mindfulness, New York: Addison Wesley Publishing Co. 
 
Langer, E. (2003). ‘ A Mindful Education’, Educational Psychologist, 28(1),pp.43-50  
 
Lea, J. et al (eds) (2003). Working in Post-Compulsory Education, Maidenhead: 
Open University Press 
 
 27 
Lowe, R. (2007). The Death of Progressive Education: How Teachers Lost Control of 
the Classroom, London: Routledge 
 
Palmer, P.J.(1998). The Courage to Teach, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Inc. 
 
Peters, R.S. (1966).  Ethics and Education, London: Allen & Unwin 
 
Peters, R.S. (1972). ‘The Education of the Emotions’; in Dearden, R.F., Hirst, P.H. & 
Peters, R.S.(eds)(op.cit.),pp.466-483 
 
Pinker, S.(1997). How the Mind Works, London: Penguin Books 
 
Plowden Report (1967). Children and Their Primary Schools, London: Her Majesty’s 
Stationery Office,  Volume 1 
 
Pluckrose, H.( 1975). Open School, Open Society, London: Evans Brothers 
 
Rathbone, C.H.(1971). Open Education: The Informal Classroom, New York: Citation 
Press 
 
Rubin, J.R.(2003).’Close Encounters of a New Kind: Toward an Integration of 
Psychoanalysis and Buddhism’, in Segall, S.R., op.cit, pp.31-60 
 
Ryle, G.(1973). The Concept of Mind, Harmondsworth: Peguin Books 
 
Salzberg, S.(1995). Loving-Kindness, Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications 
 
Scheffler, I. (1991). In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions and Other Essays in the 
Philosophy of Education, London: Routledge 
 
Searle, J.(1985). Minds, Brains and Science, London: British Broadcasting 
Corporation 
 
Segal, Z.V., Williams, J.M. & Teasdale, J.D.(2002). Mindfulness-Based Cognitive 
Therapy,  New York: Guildford Press 
 
Segall, S.R.(2003)(ed). Encountering Buddhism: Western Psychology and Buddhist 
Teachings, Albany: State University of New York Press 
 
Siegel, D.J.(2007). The Mindful Brain,  New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Smith, R. (2002).’ Self-Esteem: The Kindly Apocalypse’, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 36 (1), pp.87-100 
 
Smith, R.(2008).’The Long Slide to Happiness’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 
42(3/4), pp.559-573 
 
Standish, P.(1992). In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education, 26(1), pp.117-119 
 
Standish, P.(2007). ‘Editorial’, Journal of Philosophy of Education, 41(2) 
 
Thich Nhat Hahn (1999). The Heart of the Buddha’s Teaching, New York: Broadway 
Books 
 
 28 
Thompson, J.(2007).’ Changing Ideas and Beliefs in Lifelong Learning?’, in Aspin, 
D.(ed) Philosophical Perspectives on Lifelong Learning, Dordrecht: The Netherlands: 
Springer 
 
Warwick, I., Maxwell, C., Statham, J. Aggleton, P. & Simon, A.(2008).’ Supporting 
Mental Health and Emotional Well-Being Among Younger Students in Further 
Education’, Journal of Further & Higher Education, 32(1), pp.1-13 
 
Whitehead, A.N. (1962). The Aims of Education, London: Ernest Benn Ltd. 
 
Williams, M., Teasdale, J., Segal, Z. & Kabat-Zinn, J.(2007). The Mindful Way 
Through Depression, London, The Guilford Press 
 
Wilson, J. (1972).’ Mental Health as an Aim of Education’, in Dearden, R.F., Hirst, 
P.H. & Peters, R.S.(eds) op.cit., pp.85-94  
 
 
 
 
 
